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Central Asia as a Case Study for a Multipolar World 
Marlene Laruelle
A lexander Cooley’s book Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia is a more than welcome read for at least three 
reasons. First, at a time when the U.S. media is full of stereotypes on the Great 
Game being played out around the drawdown from Afghanistan in 2014, this 
work sheds light on the real mechanisms of balance—or of imbalance—between 
“great powers” and “small countries.” It questions the conventional wisdom 
of considering the states of Central Asia as mere victims or pawns caught in 
the game of great powers, dispossessed of means to exert pressure and devoid 
of autonomy in their foreign policy choices. As Cooley brilliantly shows, the 
Central Asian governments have rather succeeded in imposing their rules on 
the major powers, whether one is talking about Russia, the United States, or 
China. Bilateral relations in large part operate according to modalities decided 
by the local governments, not by the major capitals, which have no other choice 
than to yield to the stipulated rules. The strategies of mimetism developed by 
the Central Asian states allow them to present the particular face that is desired 
by their interlocutor. When negotiating with Moscow and Beijing, the Central 
Asian states do not conceal the authoritarian nature of their decision-making. 
When meeting with Europeans and the Americans, however, Central Asian 
leaders display concern for democratization and good governance, emphasizing 
the process of “transition” toward the norms of the Western market economy 
and democracy. In so doing, they request more time to be able to integrate the 
requested changes and show a concern to improve their governance. Central 
Asian states also reiterate Western preoccupations when it is in their own 
interests. They point out, for example, their secular legislation and refusal to 
become Islamic states, in particular when dealing with Israel. At other times, 
they play the role of countries menaced by the “Afghan threat,” so as to ingratiate 
themselves with Europe and the United States and obtain Western financing. 
Second, the book sheds light on the stark realities underlying negotiations 
between the major powers and the states of Central Asia. Far from remaining 
content with a superficial discourse on the foreign policy strategies of each 
of the actors, Cooley analyzes in-depth the mechanisms that underpin these 
states’ often transactional foreign policies. For example, they engage in tough 
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negotiations with Russia and the United States on the price for obtaining 
military bases. In the case of China, however, Central Asian states make 
strategic political concessions on issues such as the cession of territory, Uighur 
secessionism, and the adoption of China’s language on the “three evils” in 
exchange for Chinese investment. For external actors, participation in the 
logics of the Central Asian elites is inevitable: all of them thus become, willy-
nilly, the accomplices of strategies for sending Central Asia’s public money 
offshore. While this situation may not perturb Moscow or Beijing, it is much 
more problematic for Washington, which has the duty of accountability to its 
citizens and their representatives. In the end, U.S. policy in the region has a 
schizophrenic character: on the one hand, it speaks of good governance and 
rule of law, while on the other, in the name of strategic interests, it is obliged 
to follow the logic established by the elites in place. Theoretical works such as 
Great Games, Local Rules that go beyond the diplomatic level and take into 
account the realities of negotiations taking place in the hallways of power can 
only be beneficial for international relations. 
Last, the book illuminates the transformation of international affairs at 
the beginning of the 21st century. Central Asia is positioned as a test region, 
a textbook case of the evolutions underway that escape the post–Cold War 
framework and portend a more complex era. Military and diplomatic power 
obviously remain important and must not be underestimated, but they are 
complemented and rivaled by several other aspects of power: soft-power tools, 
business diplomacy, the capacity to invest huge amounts of funds in the name 
of “good neighborhood” relations, a diplomacy of fear and threat, and the 
current institutional complexity, which gives an institution such as the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation more legitimacy than it has capacity for concrete 
action. Western powers thus find themselves weakened not only by the rise 
of the Asian powers but also by the regionalization of international relations, 
which can suddenly turn a medium-sized power into an extremely powerful 
driver or spoiler. Central Asia, which is in many respects a peripheral region, 
has therefore become central on the strategic checkerboard, not because it is 
the “heartland” of the Great Game, but because it illustrates the new complexity 
of international affairs. 
Some elements that would have given extra grist to Alexander Cooley’s 
already very convincing mill of ideas—elements that I hope will figure in one 
of the author’s future projects—include the following:
1. The question of how public opinion in the countries concerned 
perceives foreign policy, or more precisely of the intertwining of 
domestic and international legitimacies, is central to understanding 
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the strategies toward and within the region. The author rightly evokes 
Central Asian political legitimacies, but less so those of Russia, China, 
and the United States, for which nation-branding and control of 
information also constitute an integral part of the tool kits available. 
2. The diversity of actors within the states themselves is also an essential 
element of explanation. Just as there exists no single U.S. political line, 
so too there exists no uniform Russian, Turkish, or indeed Chinese 
policy. Instead, policy changes depend on whether the central bodies 
of power, regional bodies, military and security actors, or business 
circles are involved. 
3. Cooley’s work is too state-centric. Central Asia provides a unique 
platform for studying the multiplicity of actors on the international 
stage: private firms, religious actors, and diasporas and migrants 
are, for example, important elements that change the balance of 
policymaking both for local governments and for external actors.
In sum, Great Games, Local Rules has quickly become essential not only for 
studies on Central Asia but also for understanding contemporary changes in 
the international arena. With the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan 
in 2014, the book highlights the possibility of a post-American Central Asia 
where the United States seems to have no other real strategy than to offer 
transactional politics to the strategies of other states and let regional powers 
and local regimes shape the future of the region.
How to Suborn Great Powers
James Sherr
E ven if it does nothing else, Alexander Cooley’s latest book, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia, will remind us 
that we are well into the revisionist phase of understanding what did—and more 
importantly, did not—change in the countries of the former Soviet Union after 
the end of the Cold War. Let us hope that the mood is contagious. The World 
Bank, the European Commission, the U.S. Congress, and the “better” business 
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consultancies are still well-provisioned with individuals promoting reform with 
the rectitude of English Whigs promoting enlightenment.
Some ten years ago, Ivan Krastev reflected on the consequences 
of pretending that “reform has nothing to do with cultures.”1 As Cooley 
demonstrates, patrimonialism is not only a culture but a tenacious and 
adaptable system. The tsarist dispensation was patrimonial as a matter of 
principle. The Soviet state, between purges and liquidations, was obliged to 
compromise with local (and often tribal) variants of patrimonialism, and 
the post-Soviet states of Central Asia are patrimonial to the core. The “who-
whom” in these countries is not conservatives versus reformers but networks 
of patrons and clients that knit society together, as well as divide it. The norms 
of this world are organic rather than rational, informal rather than public; 
and its public institutions for the most part are either decorative or captive. 
Rent-seeking is pervasive, and resources and power are interchangeable. 
What Vladislav Inozemtsev stated about Russia applies in Central Asia with 
a vengeance: “what Westerners would call corruption is not the scourge of 
the system, but the basic principle of its normal functioning.”2
As the title implies, Great Games, Local Rules is largely the story of how 
external powers—very great ones, indeed—have had to accept local rules as the 
price of presence and access. In the case of Russia, many will find this surprising. 
As the author notes, “above all, Moscow has sought regional primacy” and “of 
all the great powers, it easily possesses the most extensive array of regional 
ties” (p. 51). Even if one excludes the intra-elite and institutional linkages that 
survived the Soviet dissolution, the Russian Federation has an unequalled 
array of soft-power resources, notably the remittances provided by the region’s 
migrants (which account for 49% of Tajikistan’s entire GDP). It is also the only 
country with a plausible military counter to the region’s destabilization. Just as 
much as its Soviet predecessor (or any liberal state), contemporary Russia is 
the bearer of rationalist, integrationist agendas (recently, the Eurasian Union). 
What Cooley manages to show is that, despite these ambitions and assets, 
Russia’s agendas have been adulterated, parried, or bent to serve local interests.
Not surprisingly, it is the United States, with its metronomic litany of 
reforms and rights-driven causes, that has suffered the greatest rebuffs (notably 
after the Andijan episode of 2005). Yet, in ways that are both edifying and 
dispiriting, Washington has adapted to realities on the ground, maintaining 
 1 Ivan Krastev, Shifting Obsessions: Three Essays on the Politics of Anticorruption (New York: Central 
European University Press, 2004), 30–31.




and in some ways expanding the military presence it secured in the wake 
of September 11. The picture the book presents of the political prerogatives 
assumed by the Pentagon and U.S. Central Command—utterly disorienting to 
any product of the British military system—is a story in itself. But, according to 
Cooley, the “erosion of U.S. credibility… as an exporter of democratic values…
and accompanying loss of prestige remains the greatest casualty of Washington’s 
engagement with the Central Asian regimes” (p. 164). He finds it “doubtful that 
this steady decline in overall U.S. regional influence will be reversed” in the 
wake of the Afghanistan withdrawal (p. 164).
Thus far, it is China that has accumulated the biggest prizes. Beijing 
has broken the Russian energy monopsony, whereby Russia once could buy 
Turkmenistan’s gas for derisory sums and sell it on the European market 
at oil-indexed prices. Unlike the European Union, which dithers over gas 
interconnectors in its own jurisdiction, China has built pipelines and other 
infrastructure projects to specification and on time. Of the three big players, 
it has been the least demanding and the most adept. Yet China is not without 
flaws, and indeed illusions. It too seeks to advance Central Asian integration, 
not as a good in itself but as a complement to its own regional policy and as a 
means of diluting Uighur separatism. China might be less intrusive than the 
United States or Russia, but it is unabashedly self-interested. According to 
Cooley, “if it fails to sufficiently demonstrate that it is acting for the broader 
good, and not just as a plunderer of the region’s natural resources and energy,” 
China risks a regional backlash (p. 166).
That fact serves to remind us that, in addition to local agendas, the countries 
of Central Asia have national interests. President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s 
Kazakhstan has perfected the art of keeping external powers engaged and in 
check. Yet Nazarbayev is not alone in understanding that the alternative to 
a multivector policy is loss of autonomy and failure. What is missing in this 
schema is any articulated notion of regional interest, let alone the recognition 
that, beyond counterterrorism and regime survival, such a thing exists. As 
Cooley notes, barriers to integration persist not because national governments 
“lack the necessary technical expertise or capacity, but because elites privately 
benefit from the region’s enduring system of national regulations and border 
restrictions” (p. 160). Yet there is more to it than that. Barriers are ingrained 
in the mentalities of an ethnically and tribally demarcated world. It hardly 
makes sense to exploit such divisions if one wants to overcome them, yet the 
architects of the Soviet project set out to do both, oblivious of the essential 
contradiction between their vision and their methods. With partial success, 
they integrated Russians into distant lands; through inadvertence as much 
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as malice, they deepened the alienation of neighbors. Anyone lamenting the 
absence of integration in Central Asia should first ask what usable heritage the 
countries of the region possess. 
Despite its strictly regional focus, Great Games, Local Rules is possibly 
the most cogent critique of post–Cold War orthodoxy published to date. Yet, 
invariably, the demolition of one orthodoxy erects another. It is doubtful 
that Alexander Cooley has such an intention, but the revisionist trend, now 
encompassing the European ex-Soviet states and the EU-integration project 
itself, risks becoming an avalanche. Patrimonialism is not only antithetical to 
the norms of liberal, Western democracy; it is a viable antithesis, as Central 
Asia demonstrates in a remarkably pure form.
Yet in the European parts of the former Soviet Union, patrimonialism does 
not exist in a pure form. It is by turns adulterated, modernized, counterbalanced, 
and opposed by European inheritances, aspirations, and norms of conduct. The 
Russian Federation has perfected a workable, if unsettling, synthesis between 
patrimonialism and competitive business practice. There, as in Ukraine, 
this synthesis is anathema to a growing body of small- and medium-sized 
entrepreneurs, who not only understand what EU standards are but have 
an avowed need for them. In these states and a good many others, Western 
standards and practice have alienated some and been grist to the opportunism 
of others. But they have also created points of friction within states and begun a 
process of evolution to which even Kazakhstan might not prove immune. The 
betrayal of expectations that are largely of our own making has not brought an 
end to this evolution, let alone history, which has a habit of surprising those 
who think they understand it.
Winners and Losers of Strategic Games in Central Asia
Mamuka Tsereteli
Alexander Cooley’s Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia is a significant contribution to the intellectual 
exploration of great-power dynamics in Central Asia. Cooley skillfully 
consolidates scattered knowledge about the experience of the great powers 
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and different local actors in Central Asia into a strategic picture of the region 
that is valuable to both the academic and policymaking communities.
The book’s major argument is that three major powers—China, Russia, and 
the United States—are not involved in a nineteenth-century-style, zero-sum 
competition but rather are pursuing different individual strategic purposes in 
Central Asia that have allowed them to co-exist in the region without major 
confrontation in the last decade. At the same time, Cooley argues that the 
Central Asian states and their rulers are important actors in their own right. 
The book demonstrates local political leaders’ mastery of balancing the great 
powers in Central Asia, which has helped them maximize political sovereignty 
while also securing the survival of their regimes. 
The book shows that Moscow, Beijing, and Washington all managed 
to achieve some balance of their strategic interests in post–September 11 
Central Asia. The United States obtained basing rights and strategic access to 
Afghanistan via the region. Starting from 2008, the United States facilitated 
the development of the Northern Distribution Network, the supply line for 
U.S. troops stationed in Afghanistan that transits and benefits several Central 
Asian states. Russia has kept its southern borders secure and maintained strong 
economic and political ties with Central Asia. China has limited the spread of 
radical Islamic influence in its own Uighur-populated Xinjiang region, which 
neighbors Central Asia, and established itself as a key trade and investment 
partner for most of the states in the region. 
But Cooley’s analysis demonstrates that there are still winners and losers 
in this modern game of great powers. The strategic positions of Russia, the 
United States, and China in Central Asia are different today from what they 
were in the pre–September 11 era. First, looking at how the role of Russia has 
changed, Russia is no longer the sole outside military power accepted by the 
regional states. The presence of U.S. and other Western troops in Central Asia 
reflects the strategic retreat of Russia. Russia is also no longer the sole provider 
of the transit of energy riches from the Caspian basin, with China absorbing 
significant amounts of hydrocarbons from the region. And Russia is no longer 
the leading trade partner for the region, replaced in this position by China. 
Russia has thus clearly lost its strategic position as the dominant political and 
economic force in Central Asia, a position that it had held for almost two 
hundred years. Cooley still thinks that Russia holds broad and deep soft power 
that in the long run gives it a unique advantage over China and the United 
States and supports its “privileged role” in the region. Russia is the most 
significant provider of public goods for the region. One substantial element 
of Russia’s soft power is that it is a key source of remittances to Central Asia 
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from labor migrants, mostly from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. 
The Customs Union is another soft-power instrument that Moscow pushes 
to advance its interest. Moreover, the book argues that Russia will return to 
its position as the security guarantor for the region after withdrawal of the 
majority of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2014. Russia will face its 
own limits, however, including its ability to mobilize financial and human 
resources for a larger security presence in Central Asia. Although Russian 
limits are not discussed in the book, Cooley indicates that the Kremlin may 
not have the political will to play this role in the region. Lack of political will 
by Russia, which is trying to secure its strategic borders, can only be explained 
by a lack of financial and human resources. Moscow’s strategic recovery in 
Central Asia will be determined by a combination of internal and external 
developments at work in Russia. 
Cooley calls China a “winner on points” in the new Central Asian Great 
Game. The book demonstrates multiple gains made by China in Central 
Asia, the majority of them economic. Two facts stand out among other 
developments in the last five years. The first is that China bypassed Russia 
as the region’s leading trade partner. The second is that three countries 
in Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan) are now 
connected to China with oil or natural gas pipelines and for the first time 
in decades have access to a sizable export alternative to the Russian market 
and transit system. The geopolitical significance of these developments is 
hard to underestimate. 
At the same time, there are factors that the Central Asian states do not 
welcome in their relationships with China. The two major factors are the inflow 
of cheap labor accompanying Chinese investments and the trade imbalance, 
as Central Asia only exports mineral resources, whereas China exports a wide 
range of manufactured and finished products to the region. While some public 
opinion surveys demonstrate public discontent with China’s growing economic 
influence,1 the Central Asian states and their leaders currently enjoy China’s 
greater economic presence in the region and skillfully use it as a balancing 
factor vis-à-vis the United States and Russia. 
U.S. interests in Central Asia during the last decade were determined by 
the war on terrorism and the large-scale U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. 
Washington’s long-term interests in Central Asia beyond the overall stability 
and security of the frontline region are less clear. The United States will still 




have a military presence in Afghanistan after 2014, but the depth of U.S. interest 
in Central Asia is more difficult to predict. 
Against this backdrop of external great-power interests in Central Asia, 
Cooley also discusses the role that local elites and leaders play in Great 
Game power dynamics. Yet such internal political, social, and economic 
developments are not a major focus of the book. They are significant, however, 
from the perspective of internal security dynamics and will affect external 
choices and directions in the years to come. Three interrelated internal issues, 
in particular, will contribute to the long-term future of the region and thus 
deserve greater attention. The first is the upcoming leadership transitions in 
the two largest and most economically and politically influential Central Asian 
countries: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. How these countries manage this 
process, and whether foreign powers can influence the outcomes, will affect 
the short- and long-term direction of both domestic and foreign policy in the 
region. The second issue is demographic trends, such as the growing number of 
younger citizens with limited educational or employment opportunities, most 
significantly in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The third is the economic policies, 
corruption, and poor governance that limit economic growth and the process 
of job creation. The official statistics grossly underestimate unemployment, 
and the growing number of unemployed young men will inevitably lead to 
social and economic conflicts that could easily evolve into security challenges 
unless addressed by policymakers. The book would gain tremendously by 
greater reflection on these three issues of internal development and their 
potential impact on great-power competition in the region. 
Overall, in Great Games, Local Rules, Cooley manages to combine theories 
of international relations with empirical data about the interaction between 
great powers and local actors in Central Asia. He thus lays the groundwork for 
a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of strategic development in 
the region. The book will be a great source of knowledge for students of Central 
Asia and policymakers alike.
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Old Games, New Rules? 
Great Powers in the New Central Asia
Kathryn Stoner
I n the nineteenth century, the British and Russian empires squared off in Central Asia. Britain was fixated on protecting its colony in India, and 
worried about political decay and Russian assertiveness in the Islamic areas 
to the north, particularly Afghanistan and what are now, more or less, the five 
Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan. For its part, Russia was primarily interested in keeping the peace 
and gradually expanding its empire among the restive khanates to the south, 
if not actually going all the way to India. In the end, a war never took place 
between these two great powers of the day, but an ongoing set of strategic games 
transpired as Russia and Britain tried to capture enhanced trade opportunities 
that ran through the Silk Road regions. 
Although the players now are a significantly weakened Russia, the United 
States, and China, the competition between great powers in the nineteenth 
century parallels the Great Games being played in Central Asia today that 
are so well documented in Alexander Cooley’s new book Great Games, 
Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia. One of the great 
strengths of Cooley’s book is to explain how the interests of contemporary 
great powers are often thwarted or manipulated by corrupt Central Asian 
leaders bent on self-preservation. Still, cooperation between Central Asian 
states and the United States, China, and Russia has been more the norm than 
the exception, even if the great powers have been unable to dictate outcomes 
to local authorities.
With the partial exception of Russia, the interests of contemporary players 
of the Great Game in Central Asia are rather different than those of their 
nineteenth-century predecessors. The United States has become involved 
in Central Asia as part of the war on terrorism and U.S. efforts to wipe out 
the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Russia, the natural successor state 
to the Soviet Union, has a traditional geostrategic interest in Central Asia 
and views the region as part of its natural sphere of interest and security. 
Russia is also concerned with the protection of significant ethnic Russian 
populations, particularly in Kazakhstan, and perhaps most centrally, control 
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over the region’s lucrative gas and oil markets. China is a relative newcomer to 
political engagement in Central Asia. Like the United States, its interests are far 
narrower than Russia’s and are primarily a result of Beijing’s need to stabilize 
and prevent separation of the ethnically Uighur Xinjiang Province. To be sure, 
however, all three contemporary great powers are interested in Central Asia to 
further their own security, as were Britain and Russia in the nineteenth century. 
Cooley’s study of the current Great Games played by local rules is 
comprehensive, well-researched, and accessible. Distinct from other recent 
scholarship on the region, the book’s focus is not domestic politics alone or the 
resource riches of some Central Asian governments but the interaction between 
domestic politics and international relations in a complex and increasingly 
important part of the world. For students of international relations, great-power 
interactions in Central Asia have “become a natural experiment for observing 
the dynamics of a multipolar world, including the decline of U.S. authority, the 
pushback against Western attempts to promote democratization and human 
rights, and the rise of China as an external donor and regional leader” (p. xiv). 
As a result, Cooley’s book is a welcome addition to the literature on post-
communist countries, international relations, and Central Asian politics.
Despite its considerable strengths, there are a few areas where one might 
quibble with the book’s analysis. First, although Cooley starts out emphasizing 
that the regimes in Central Asia play their weak geopolitical hands strongly 
against great-power interests, he overlooks the fact that there is frequently an 
interactive effect between local and great-power interests. We learn a great 
deal in chapter 7, for example, about the double-dealing that went on between 
Russia and Kyrgyzstan in the threatened 2009 eviction of U.S. forces from the 
Manas airbase, a key staging and supply post for the U.S. military’s efforts in 
Afghanistan. But this sort of manipulation by Kyrgyzstan would not have 
happened had Russia not supported it. Thus, it is not accurate to portray the 
Kyrgyz as holding all the cards in this round since Russia clearly controlled 
the game board. 
Second, and related, Cooley underemphasizes the fact that the United 
States, in particular, has extremely narrow interests in Central Asia limited 
to its involvement in Afghanistan. The United States has no other territorial, 
economic, or resource interests in the region. This puts it in a rather different 
position in dealing with Central Asian states and gives it very little regional 
leverage. The United States cannot, like Russia, threaten to send back a huge 
influx of migrants to Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan should they not bend to its 
will; it cannot credibly promise great trade inflows into the area as China can. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the United States maintains its temporary 
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military bases at the whim of the leaders of Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan (in 
coordination with their traditional partner and sometimes ruler Russia). Given 
this, we also should not find it surprising that the United States would have 
little leverage in promoting democracy or human rights in the region. That is, 
Russia and China have greater influence over Central Asian states as a natural 
function of geography in comparison to the United States. They live in the 
neighborhood. This is perhaps why the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
has worked better than any other regional international organization. Further, 
Russia can and has asserted itself in a rather unsavory way in Central Asian 
politics (as it has in Ukrainian and Georgian politics, for example). Moscow 
can manipulate gas and oil markets in the region, turn trade routes on or off, 
use soft and hard power, and upset the stability of any Central Asian state that 
it wants to. Russia is a regional hegemon that occasionally must negotiate with 
weaker powers, as Cooley notes. It is rarely, however, defeated by them on issues 
of great strategic importance. 
Third, a more significant shortcoming is the book’s tendency to overlook 
the extent to which Central Asian states diverge from one another and the effect 
that this might have on their relationships with Russia, China, and the United 
States. While it is fair to say, as Cooley does, using Freedom House metrics, 
that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan are 
“not free,” their regimes are not all the same either. Uzbekistan has a much 
harsher form of autocracy than does Kazakhstan, for example. Tajikistan and 
Kazakhstan differ significantly in terms of human development and state 
capacity. Kyrgyzstan has some experience with more liberalized forms of 
government than the other four Central Asian states, and it is the only one of the 
five states to have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Turkmenistan 
is, of course, a semi-Stalinist and largely isolated enigma. 
The divergence in types of autocracies in Central Asia could reasonably 
affect their interactions with the three great powers operating in the region. 
Does the fact that Russia and China are both autocracies change the nature and 
quality of interactions with the autocratic, patrimonial regimes in Central Asia, 
for example? We should expect that it would. China is not concerned about 
liberalization in Uzbekistan (as was the United States in the first part of the 
2000s) and is far more interested in Kyrgyzstan’s stability than its potential for 
democracy. Beijing also does not tie aid or trade to progress on human rights, 
as Washington has attempted to do. Similarly, the Russian state shares many of 
the same pathologies as the elite-dominated, highly personalized, and under-
institutionalized regimes of Central Asia, but it has less in common with more 
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liberalized states such as Kyrgyzstan. Should we, therefore, expect it to have a 
more cooperative relationship with some Central Asian states than with others? 
Fourth, and related to the point above, great-power interests are not, of 
course, the same in each of the five Central Asian states. China, Russia, and the 
United States may have more or less leverage in one country than in another 
as a result. Russia, for example, has significant trade flows with Kazakhstan. 
The two countries also share a huge border, and ethnic Russians amount to 
33%–50% of the population of Kazakhstan. The president of Kazakhstan 
speaks Russian. Both states’ economies are heavily dependent on oil and gas. 
In contrast, Russia has a somewhat different set of interests in Kyrgyzstan. 
Moscow is not, for example, particularly supportive of any “color” revolution 
there, given its potential to spread to Russia itself. Cooley does not tell us what 
effect these differences might have on strategic interactions between each of 
the great powers and respective Central Asian states.
Fifth, and finally, Cooley argues that the Great Game in Central Asia over 
the past decade demonstrates the decline in U.S. power abroad. Of the three 
powers operating there, China is the strongest, followed closely by Russia, with 
the United States lagging far behind. I disagree, however, that this is a good 
test of U.S. power in comparison to the effort in Iraq or Afghanistan where 
regime change and state-building became the agendas. That is, it may be true 
that U.S. power is declining, but Central Asia is not a critical case where we 
might accurately evaluate U.S. power relative to China or Russia. After all, 
the United States has the least to gain (and has made the smallest effort) of 
all three great powers to influence politics in Central Asia. Its interests in the 
region are confined (as Cooley himself notes) very narrowly to the security 
of its temporary bases in Kyrgyzstan (and formerly in Uzbekistan). It is not 
attempting regime change in any of these countries, although it continues to 
support liberalization in Kyrgyzstan as it did in the 1990s. The amount of money 
that Cooley documents was spent on human rights and democracy promotion 
in Uzbekistan, for example, was pocket change to the U.S. government; it was 
not a serious effort to democratize the region. Similarly, the United States has 
made few attempts to trade with or create sustainable multilateral institutions 
in the region, as neighboring China and Russia have done. Before the war in 
Afghanistan, the United States had little involvement in Central Asia. After 
the drawdown of troops in 2014, that will undoubtedly again be the case, even 
with a lingering military presence. 
Despite these five critiques, Alexander Cooley has written an excellent book. 
It should be required reading for anyone interested in better understanding 
one of the most fascinating and complex areas of the world.
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Why Washington Needs to Integrate the  
New Silk Road with the Pivot to Asia
Andrew C. Kuchins
Alexander Cooley’s Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia is a must-read strategic primer of the challenges 
and opportunities for any aspiring great power in Central Asia. His analysis 
tracks the varying successes of the United States, Russia, and China in 
Central Asia since 2001 and the onset of the war in Afghanistan. The events 
of September 11 dramatically increased Washington’s interests in the region 
and shifted them predominantly to support the war in Afghanistan. During 
this past decade under Vladimir Putin, Russia—recovering from its loss of 
empire and the economic disaster of the 1990s—has sought to reassert its 
influence through various bilateral policies and multilateral institutions. 
China’s regional influence has grown principally through economic means, 
and its favored multilateral security and economic institution is the aptly 
named Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
But while great powers may have grand designs, the real story of Cooley’s 
book is how effectively regional leaders have been able to manipulate and play 
off the economic and security interests of the great powers to strengthen the 
sovereignty of their states, as well as increase their political and economic 
leverage over domestic political competitors. If a state is unwilling to play 
by local rules, achieving other policy goals will be met with a mounting 
parade of obstacles. In the case of the United States, for example, this meant 
quieting objections to human rights violations and democratic shortcomings 
for return for support in Afghan war efforts. Of course, such trade-offs offend 
the high morals that Americans like to claim in U.S. foreign policy. I recall 
several years ago a State Department official telling me with a straight face 
that our engagement of Central Asian states in the Northern Distribution 
Network, a set of new transit corridors to support U.S. troops in Afghanistan, 
would increase our ability to support the cause of defending human rights 
in Central Asia. Suffice to say, there has been no evidence in the past three 
years to support this contention.
The track record of the Russians since 2001 has been mixed at best. After 
more than one hundred years as part of the Russian empire and the Soviet 
andrew c. kuchins  is Director and Senior Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center 
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Union, Central Asian states remain very sensitive to initiatives from Moscow, 
whose likely goal is to erode their sovereignty or interfere on one side or 
another in their domestic politics. Russia, as a provider of public goods, 
strikes Central Asian elites as almost oxymoronic. Regional perceptions of the 
United States as a provider of public goods may be higher, but Washington’s 
credibility suffers from being viewed as a “short-timer” whose interests can be 
ever so fickle. Cooley argues that in this triangular competition over the past 
decade or so, China has probably “won on points,” as Beijing is viewed as only 
interested in economic ties that increase jobs and build infrastructure (p. 165). 
However, the accelerating shift to a genuinely multipolar environment in 
Eurasia increases the options for Central Asian states to partner with outside 
countries, including India, Turkey, Iran, and others; thus, the competition 
grows for access to the region’s assets, be they military, strategic, economic, 
or otherwise.
Certainly, from a U.S. standpoint, we are at a crossroads with Central Asia. 
As the United States withdraws its troops from Afghanistan, U.S. interest and 
influence in the region, as Cooley suggests, is bound to decline. After more 
than a decade in Afghanistan and Iraq, the mantra “No more land wars in 
Eurasia” reverberates from the White House to Foggy Bottom to the Pentagon. 
The new strategic buzz in Washington is the “pivot to Asia,” which essentially 
boils down to the management of the rise of China’s power and influence in 
the years and decades to come. But the Obama administration’s conception 
of Asia goes back more than a hundred years ago to that of Admiral Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, the United States’ first great strategic thinker. Mahan regarded 
Asia as consisting of East Asia, or the area from Northeast Asia to Southeast 
Asia. Thus, Washington’s focus has been on the Asia-Pacific region for over a 
century, as evidenced by wars with Japan, Korea, and Vietnam.
China’s historical and cultural interpretation of Asia is not surprisingly 
very different, as it includes eastern areas of Russia to its north, Central Asia 
and Afghanistan to its west, and Pakistan and India to its southwest. Just 
as the Obama administration announced its pivot to Asia, leading Chinese 
strategic thinkers, such as Wang Jisi at Beijing University, began to increasingly 
advocate for China’s march to the west through Central Asia to Iran and the 
greater Middle East.1 This is not to suggest that China views these regions to 
the north, west, and south as its territory—although China is engaged in a 
long-standing territorial dispute with India and also made a small claim in 
 1 See Wang Jisi, “Marching Westwards: The Rebalancing of China’s Geostrategy,” International and 
Strategic Studies, no. 73 (2012).
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July 2012 to seventeen kilometers in the Altai region, despite a 2004 border 
treaty with Russia that was to resolve the issue forever. Wang is not suggesting 
a military march, of course, but rather a continued expansion of Chinese 
economic influence and power to the west. 
While it may be politically incorrect to use the word “containment” in 
regard to U.S. policy toward China, containment is certainly how the pivot to 
Asia is understood in Beijing. So the Chinese response will be to continue to 
build high-speed trains, highways, and pipelines from western China to the 
greater Middle East, as well as to ports on the Indian Ocean, as their trade and 
investment ties accompany this strategic goal. I should not overstate this since 
China’s highest strategic and economic priorities will lie to its east for a long time 
to come. But increasing access and influence to the north, west, and southwest 
are significant and natural strategic goals as well. There is a strong argument for 
Beijing to do so, as a westward push could provide transcontinental shipping 
routes for oil, gas, and other goods that would be far removed from the purview 
of the U.S. Navy.
This brings us back to the theme of Cooley’s book: the way in which 
the jockeying of Russian, U.S., and Chinese great-power designs among the 
Central Asian states enhance these states own sovereignty and domestic political 
power. Beijing’s economic power in this part of the world will continue to grow, 
absent an economic meltdown in China. Chinese companies, unconstrained 
by anything like the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or shareholder 
reporting, will continue to line the pockets of local, regional, and national 
officials in Central Asia to strengthen their access to the region’s mineral and 
hydrocarbon resources and will build more transit infrastructure to ship these 
goods to the Chinese market. Ever since the financial crisis, China, with its 
more than $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, has been on a global buying 
spree that increasingly raises concerns, especially among its mineral-rich 
neighbors. Chinese domination of Mongolia’s rapidly growing economy (the 
second-fastest growing economy in the world right now) reached such a point 
that the parliament in Ulaanbaatar recently passed legislation that requires 
legislative approval of any foreign investment over $70 million.2 Even in Central 
Asia’s largest and most wealthy state, Kazakhstan, there is considerable concern 
about the increasing Chinese stakes in Kazakh oil and gas resources, as well as 
about illegal Chinese migrant workers. Russia is also concerned that its eastern 
 2 See Oliver Backes, “China at the Gates: China’s Impact on Mongolian Natural Resources and 




regions, which are rich in hydrocarbon and mineral wealth, will be gobbled up 
by Chinese companies, effectively eroding Russian sovereignty.
The best defense for the Central Asian states, Russia, and all of China’s 
neighbors is improvement of their investment environments to make them 
more attractive to a wider set of bidders. But this requires improved governance, 
transparent and effective rule of law, strengthened property rights, and all of 
those good things that attack the foundations of patrimonial authoritarian 
systems. If China’s economic presence is viewed as too heavy-handed or 
pervasive, there will be increasing public opposition to it that local leaders 
will have to address. The China factor was not the main reason behind the riots 
in Zhanozhen, Kazakhstan, in December 2011, but it did play a role.
Probably the most potentially effective policy strategy that the United 
States has in this region in the coming years is the so-called vision of a new 
Silk Road: a regional economic cooperation strategy for Afghanistan and its 
neighbors that emphasizes strengthening both hard and soft trade and transit 
infrastructure to link the “heart of Asia” with the greater Middle East, East 
Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Russia, and Europe. Although the region 
certainly needs more railroads, roads, modern airports, and the like, the 
biggest obstacle to moving goods rapidly and predictably to multiple markets 
in all directions is bureaucratic and institutional—what both I and Cooley 
call “borders acting as toll booths” (p. 154). As virtually all studies conclude, 
reduction of graft and red tape at the borders will do more to strengthen 
regional economic connectivity and increase the variety of market options 
for Central Asian states than any other policy action. Cooley is right to 
conclude that, so far, the internal nature of the regional patrimonial states is 
the biggest obstacle (see pp. 149–61), but if national sovereignty in the region 
feels under greater threat, perhaps reviving the network of transcontinental 
transit corridors that Washington calls the new Silk Road may achieve a 
more positive response from albeit reluctant regional leaders. The United 
States would benefit from viewing support for this initiative as a key part of 
the strategic pivot to Asia.
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Domestic Challenges, International Opportunities:  
Understanding Security Cooperation in Central Asia
Erica Marat
T he Central Asian countries are often defined as passive observers of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese rivalry, a conflict of interests that resembles 
the Great Game between Great Britain and tsarist Russia roughly a century ago. 
The comparison is often drawn for lack of a better empirical understanding 
of how Central Asia’s five post-Soviet countries function on the international 
scene, while the United States’ interest in the region significantly increased in the 
post–September 11 era, much to the dismay of neighboring Russia and China. 
Alexander Cooley’s Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power 
Contest in Central Asia dispels the myth that these “big three” are locked into 
constant competition. While competition among the United States, Russia, 
and China exists, there are also instances of collaboration on joint goals, 
mimicking of one another’s policies, and opportunities to free ride, owing to 
various security arrangements led by one or another of the three. 
Yet it is the Central Asian political elites who seem to benefit the most 
from the increased interest of global powers. The political elites in Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have developed “local 
rules” for playing the big three against each other for the benefit of domestic 
audiences, primarily to prevail over political rivals and strengthen their own 
hold on power. The most blatant example of leveraging the Kremlin’s displeasure 
with the U.S. military to benefit the mercantile interests of the political elites 
comes from Kyrgyzstan’s former president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. In 2009, 
Bakiyev secured both a $2 billion loan from Russia and a significant increase 
in U.S. payments to use an airbase in Bishkek by first announcing that he would 
expel the U.S. military from the base and then four months later changing his 
mind. Uzbekistan president Islam Karimov has also been skillful in keeping 
both Russia and the United States nervous about his engagement in regional 
initiatives, such as the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO) or providing access to the U.S.-NATO Northern Distribution Network 
for Afghanistan. 
Just as Cooley uncovers the patrimonial logic of the Central Asian leaders’ 
foreign policy, he also shows how each of the big three powers at one time 
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or another developed patron-client relations with the Central Asian states. 
Seeking to advance their own interests in the region, Moscow, Washington, and 
Beijing often ignored reports of human rights abuses and were ready to engage 
with corrupt leaders if needed. By explaining the logic of the big three’s policy 
decisions in Central Asia since the September 11 terrorist attacks, Great Games, 
Local Rules is as much a book about transnational and domestic corruption as 
it is about international relations.
The book also demonstrates how regional actors—India, South Korea, 
Turkey, and Japan—were effectively squeezed out of Central Asia by the 
overwhelming presence of the big three. Those countries, although sharing 
economic and political interests in the region, were unable to build trade 
relations and political alliances with the Central Asian countries because 
these niches were quickly filled by regional organizations led by Russia, 
China, and the United States.
Great Games, Local Rules offers a rich analytical and empirical basis for 
further research in both international relations and Central Asian studies. 
The book poses three interrelated questions about how local rules developed 
in response to the global powers’ competition in Central Asia. First, are local 
rules in Central Asia the sign of a new norm in which small countries play great 
powers against each other instead of looking for win-win solutions? Are they 
emerging as a result of declining Western influence? Beyond Central Asia, does 
the collaboration among several global powers and small states follow a similar 
logic? Cooley explains the emergence of local rules as the product of a post-
Western world in which the United States must compete with regional powers.
Second, how uniform are the local rules of Central Asia? The ousting of 
Bakiyev in 2010 demonstrated that erratic foreign policy breeds corruption 
and angers opposition groups. By contrast, Kazakhstan president Nursultan 
Nazarbayev’s balanced foreign policy has led to years of fruitful relations with 
Washington, Moscow, and Beijing and contributed to strong domestic support 
for his regime. Did Bakiyev overplay his advantages? And is Nazarbayev-like 
behavior the epitome of effective local rules in the region? 
Finally, can the Central Asian states in fact be treated as a coherent region? 
Great Games, Local Rules approaches the five states as constituting a region, 
while acknowledging that they in no way function as a single economic bloc. 
The differences among these countries’ economic and political development 
continue to grow wider over time. Because the five states lack economic 
integration and have been implementing restrictive border regimes, Cooley asks 
whether Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan should be considered in the 
same fashion as, for instance, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova—countries that 
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share geographical proximity but are substantially different from one another 
in terms of post-Soviet political and economic development.
Cooley tackles this issue by outlining several perspectives that regard 
Central Asia as a region. The United States, Russia, and China lump the 
Central Asian states together because of the political and security interests they 
pursue there. Furthermore, the Central Asian states themselves often pretend 
for regional audiences to function as political allies, even though economic 
integration has not taken place. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, regional 
integration is taking place from the bottom up, courtesy of shuttle traders 
who bypass strict border regimes in search of profit. These shuttle traders 
transit goods from China through Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and 
Tajikistan. These informal trade routes might one day shape the parameters of 
regional trade agreements. 
By posing these questions, Great Games, Local Rules is an important 
stepping-stone toward building a theory of international relations based on 
Central Asia that differs from classical Western approaches. The book’s empirical 
richness should appeal to a wide range of readers looking to understand how 
Russia, China, and the United States formulate their policies toward Central 
Asia as well as how those policies are received in the region. 
The Rules of Central Asia’s Games Are Changing
S. Enders Wimbush
A lexander Cooley’s concise and well-written analysis of the evolving contest among Russia, China, and the United States for position and 
influence in Central Asia is indeed welcome. Great Games, Local Rules: The 
New Great Power Contest in Central Asia is likely to be the starting point for 
future assessments of this region. These should multiply as the complexity of 
the regional and global dynamics that affect Central Asia deepens.
New actors are already entering the region with their own unique 
objectives and strategies. Some traditional actors will be eclipsed as their 
capabilities wane or as they seek respite from distant entanglements there. 
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New generations of Central Asian elites will soon compete for power, and 
some will harbor very different visions for how their countries should 
be governed, strategically aligned, and integrated into a global economy. 
Conflicts spawned by the region’s failed and failing states and aggressive 
ideologies from abroad will produce security challenges that cascade 
across borders. Stability will prove elusive and outright peace probably 
unobtainable. Not surprisingly, today’s “rules of the game,” appropriately 
described by Cooley, will change. 
I would argue that by 2012, when Great Games, Local Rules appeared, the 
rules were already evolving in several Central Asian countries, not changing 
so much as adding new layers. Cooley is correct to emphasize the Soviet-era 
mindset of today’s generation of Central Asian leaders. For them, ensuring the 
survival of their patrimonial regimes, gaming their economies for maximum 
personal gain, and guarding the gate lest outside influences disrupt these comfy 
arrangements is instinctive.
But it is increasingly evident that this is not the limit of their strategic 
visions, at least not all of them. Uzbekistan’s president Islam Karimov is 
notable for his grasp of Central Asia’s larger strategic dynamics. For example, 
his efforts to encourage tighter economic integration with Afghanistan 
through energy and transport demonstrate his understanding of how that 
country’s vulnerabilities could spike after the U.S. withdrawal in 2014 and affect 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan Nazarbayev has 
substantially redesigned his country’s foreign-policy objectives and practices, 
which recently featured hosting 5+2 talks on Iran’s nuclear ambitions.1 Even 
hermetically sealed Turkmenistan shows an inclination in this direction with 
its recent energy diplomacy. 
Great Games, Local Rules masterfully describes how the Central Asian 
leaders successfully play the great powers off against each other, often resulting 
in the latter acquiescing to the local rules of the game. But more is at work 
here, at least in some places—something we might think of as strategic intent 
that transcends purely local interests. Another way to describe this distinction 
is to note the sharp contrast of these states’ former status as the objects of 
other states’ foreign policy with their current status as strategic actors in their 
own right. One might interpret these countries’ design of larger strategies 
as efforts to double-down on the patrimonial rules Cooley describes, and 
that might be right. But I doubt that doubling-down is the sole or even the 
 1 The 5+2 talks include Transnistria, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, and the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe, plus the United States and the European Union.
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most powerful incentive. The emerging Central Asian landscape described 
by Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse in their groundbreaking book 
Globalizing Central Asia will become increasingly inhospitable terrain for the 
old rules, though they will certainly linger for at least a generation or more. We 
should anticipate several Central Asian states becoming more assertive actors 
in a larger strategic universe, which is where their interests will increasingly 
be located. This will add additional complexity and uncertainty to the new 
great-power contest in the region. 
Every great contest needs some great contestants. Yet the triangular 
contest for power in Central Asia among Russia, China, and the United 
States is very unequal, more scalene than equilateral. Of these, Russia strikes 
me as the least able to compete effectively for the long haul. Spiraling down 
across virtually all measures of power, authority, and influence, Russia 
is a dying state tempting debilitating crises at multiple levels. Cooley’s 
discussion of Russia’s seeming indifference to the fate of Central Asia after 
the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 is spot on, as is his assessment that “the 
main challenge in analyzing Russian policy toward Central Asia is that it 
lacks a single overriding strategic goal” (p. 51). This begs the question: how 
can a state compete effectively if its objectives are unclear and its competitive 
resources are being quickly depleted? Nearly all Russian initiatives to 
regain prestige and stature in the region have failed to impress the Central 
Asians, much less the Chinese. Writing in 2011, I concluded that “Russia 
is not one of Asia’s rising powers but the opposite.”2 I see nothing today 
suggesting otherwise. 
Can we say that the United States also lacks an overriding strategic goal in 
Central Asia? When Central Asia was suddenly released from Soviet control in 
1991, Americans were even more indifferent to the region than the Russians 
because few of them knew anything about it. I am unaware of Central Asia ever 
figuring in U.S. strategy at more than a transactional level. Cooley’s account 
strengthens this conclusion.
President Obama underlined the transactional basis of U.S. involvement 
by fixing the date for the transaction to end in 2014. This decision was 
apparently made without regard for the longer-term strategic implications 
of the United States’ virtual disappearance from this contest—not just 
for China and Russia but for all of Eurasia’s key actors. Consider that 
Central Asia today is arguably the world’s most contested geography. 
 2 S. Enders Wimbush, “Great Games in Central Asia,” in Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to 
Its Rising Powers—China and India, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough (Seattle: 
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), 279.
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Powerful regional states—Russia, China, India, Iran, and Turkey—all seek 
a competitive advantage in the Central Asian space. This list includes 
four nuclear powers, with a fifth (Iran) close at hand and possibly a sixth 
(Turkey) further over the horizon. Outside contestants—for example, the 
United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia—increase 
the density of this strategic soup. Is this an arena where the United States 
can afford strategic fatigue?
Meanwhile, China’s quiet incremental penetration of Central Asia gathers 
momentum. It is not without issue, and occasionally the Chinese encounter 
pushback on the ground, usually when they are insensitive to cultural 
norms, customs, or preferences. But Beijing’s use of economic incentives, a 
comparatively efficient labor force, and engaged regional organizations like 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, through which China can identify 
opportunities and leverage corporate diplomacy, far outstrips Russia’s ability 
to compete or counter. To the extent that Central Asia is a great-power contest, 
it is now China’s to lose. 
With the United States heading for Central Asia’s exits, the contest loses a 
strong stabilizing player. One wonders if the White House ever considered how 
a continued U.S. presence in the region, perhaps no more than a few hundred 
soldiers in training missions and other activities, might affect the blossoming 
uncertainties that a U.S. absence will undoubtedly produce. As I speculated 
last year in testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, such a residual 
presence—in Uzbekistan, for example—could exert a calming influence on 
what could rapidly become an unruly and possibly violent competition among 
Central Asia’s other contestants.3
Cooley’s analysis and logical exposition alert readers to the possibility 
of alternative futures in Central Asia about which the United States has 
thought little and for which it is ill prepared. Great Games, Local Rules is 
in that respect an excellent starting point. I hope Cooley will accept his 
own challenge.
 3 S. Enders Wimbush, “The United States and Central Asia,” testimony before the House 
Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Washington, D.C., July 24, 2012 u http://archives.
republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA14-WState-WimbushS-20120724.pdf.
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Can We Change the Rules?  
External Actors and Central Asia Beyond 2014
Alexander Cooley
I wrote Great Games, Local Rules in the hope of facilitating a dialogue between observers of Central Asia and international relations scholars interested in 
the political dynamics of the post–Cold War world. For too long, the latter group 
has ignored Central Asia, dismissing it as an exotic arena of imperial competition 
and opaque local tradition that is of little global relevance. Specifically, I wished 
to flag what I considered important trends of the multipolar regional order—
U.S. tacit security bargains and declining normative power, the Russian-led 
backlash against Western democratic norms and human rights promotion, 
and China’s rise as a dominant economic player. Most importantly, I wanted to 
draw wider attention to the statecraft of the Central Asian states, demonstrating 
how relatively weaker states can still channel, translate, and manipulate external 
interests and agendas for their own domestic political purposes.
Engaging in an Asia Policy discussion about these ideas is therefore a 
deeply enriching and humbling opportunity, for the scholars assembled in 
this forum are all distinguished researchers and long-time observers of the 
Eurasian political landscape. A short response cannot do all of their points 
justice so I look forward to engaging with the important issues they raise 
beyond just these pages.
I have grouped my response to the reviews into three categories of topics 
raised by the roundtable participants: (1) the appropriateness of my analytical 
framework for explaining major regional developments and interactions, (2) 
the relevance of Central Asia’s lessons to other areas of the post–Cold War 
world, and (3) the implications for U.S. policy toward the region following the 
planned U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. 
The Analytical Framework of Great Games, Local Rules
My main analytical purpose in the book is to show how the “big three” 
external powers have sought different strategic goals in the region, but I also 
illuminate how, in addition to competition, the external powers have cooperated, 
mimicked, and learned from one another as they interacted in the Central 
alexander cooley  is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Barnard 
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Asian arena. All the while, the region’s autocrats have used these external 
interactions as opportunities to extract resources to preserve their regimes, feed 
their domestic patronage machines, and push back against external criticism or 
conditions that might threaten the political status quo. James Sherr identifies 
these patrimonial dynamics as the political antithesis of western liberal and 
democratic institutions, though he is prudent to caution that the region’s 
patrimonialism is neither pure nor immune from all transformative attempts. 
Yet the lens of patronage politics provides what I think is a theoretically useful 
assumption for examining internal-external interactions. Rent-seeking, pseudo-
reforms, and competing norms are logical consequences that flow from these 
political imperatives, rather than an exceptional or even culturally bound set 
of local behaviors.
Nevertheless, in a bid for parsimony, I do oversimplify. Kathryn Stoner 
rightly suspects that the different flavors of authoritarianism within the region 
might also affect their patterns of external engagement. How else can one explain 
Turkmenistan’s latching onto China so quickly as its main external patron, the 
close Kazakh-Russian partnership, or the prickly relations of repressive and 
paranoid Uzbek president Islam Karimov with both Moscow and Washington? 
Marlene Laruelle accurately notes that societal actors, such as businesses and 
migrants, are absent from my state-centric account, while Enders Wimbush and 
Sherr point out that some of the Central Asian states have graduated beyond 
these elite-led imperatives and are pursuing external engagements with the 
purpose of both enhancing their international standing (Kazakhstan especially) 
and influencing the region more broadly (in the case of Uzbekistan). These 
are fair and important observations. And even competitive patrimonialism 
has its limits. As Erica Marat observes, Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiyev 
overplayed his hand when he initiated a public bidding war between Russia 
and the United States over the Manas airbase. 
Although regional elites undoubtedly will be concerned with an increasingly 
complex array of personal, social, and national agendas going forward, it is 
worth recalling the region’s political context during the 2000s. All of the regions’ 
rulers consolidated their grip on power and then proceeded to securitize their 
coercive organs in response to counterterrorism imperatives and perceptions of 
imminent transnational regime threats. In so doing, they were supported by all 
three external security patrons. Perhaps a more productive way of advancing our 
understanding, to echo John Heathershaw’s earlier critique of my book, would 
be to think more systematically about how these elites and new societal actors 
are joined in a number of transnational networks that interpenetrate the region, 
be it narcotics trafficking, the unofficial shuttle trade, money laundering, and 
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foreign deal-making financiers, or as sites for the dissemination of contested 
norms and international standards. 
The participants also note other important ways in which the analysis 
might be starting to date itself. Both Andrew Kuchins and Wimbush, I believe 
correctly, observe a growing complexity and contestation over the region that 
involves not only the “big three” patrons of Russia, the United States, and 
China, but several other actors such as Turkey, India, South Korea, Japan, the 
Gulf States, and Iran. These states too offer the Central Asian governments new 
opportunities and strategic partnerships; though, as I briefly explore in the case 
of India negotiating for basing rights with Tajikistan, they occasionally have also 
overestimated the extent of their own potential for regional influence. Mamuka 
Tsereteli also points to a looming social backlash against Chinese economic 
penetration in the region, especially the visible presence of Chinese workers 
and the asymmetrical terms of trade China has forged with the region. This is 
an important issue that at some point will surely come to a head, though unlike 
parts of Africa that have experienced anti-Chinese backlashes, Central Asia’s 
less vibrant civil societies and weaker organized labor movements may limit 
the formal political opportunities for such campaigns.
Central Asia and the Dynamics, Institutions, and Norms  
of International Order
Sherr describes Great Games as a “cogent critique of post-Cold War 
orthodoxy.” I am not accustomed to sporting the revisionist label, but I will 
gladly accept it if the book prompts scholars and policymakers to re-examine 
some underlying assumptions about the extent of Western influence in 
emerging regional orders in areas such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia, 
and Latin America. 
On the U.S. regional role, in particular, Stoner advances an important and 
powerful counterargument: given the United States’ overwhelming interest in 
stabilizing Afghanistan, and the resulting instrumentalization of the region for 
that military campaign, U.S. policy toward Central Asia is sui generis, hardly 
comparable to its role in other parts of the world. In short, the United States did 
not fail in its bid to influence Central Asia, mostly because Washington did not 
actually commit significant levels of resources or political capital to the region.
Many U.S. policymakers share Stoner’s observations, and she is on the 
mark to say that the United States has not intensively engaged with the region 
beyond the security sphere. However, her comparative point follows only if 
we view U.S. strategic interest and focus as the primary determinants of its 
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actual international influence. A cursory look at the political outcomes of U.S. 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq suggests otherwise.
Here, Marat frames the question helpfully: is diminished U.S. standing in 
Central Asia the result of U.S. decline or the result of the Central Asian states 
actively seeking and finding alternative patrons who are less critical of their 
internal policies? If we analytically privilege how the Central Asian states 
have become more adept at leveraging alternatives and pushing back against 
the Western normative agenda, then the mechanism explaining this observed 
U.S. waning is both beyond the scope of U.S. intentions and more readily 
transferrable to other regions. 
A couple of examples of both “hard security” and “soft power” illustrate 
the importance of this analytical distinction. For example, the fact that the 
United States has provided private goods to the Uzbek and Kyrgyz governments 
to maintain military bases and access routes in the face of Russian pressure 
could be, on its own, explained away as an unremarkable and one-off side 
effect of its Afghanistan-centered engagement. But taken together with other 
recent failed bargains and contested access agreements—including the Iraqi 
government’s refusal to grant the United States a long-term status of forces 
agreement in 2011, Pakistan’s periodic closure of the southern logical routes 
and demands for more security assistance, and the political turbulence over 
U.S. military facilities in Ecuador or Bahrain, where host governments have 
turned to alternative patrons (China and Saudi Arabia, respectively)—it is 
more difficult to dismiss the Central Asian cases as isolated. U.S. base hosts and 
strategic partners worldwide appear increasingly willing to invoke exit options 
for domestic political purposes.1
In the soft-power sphere, the U.S. and Western role as the primary providers 
of public goods—development assistance, investments in infrastructure, 
rulemaking, and standard setting—is also clearly being undermined. China 
offers loans and infrastructure financing without the domestic conditions 
demanded by Western-dominated international financial institutions. However, 
unlike its role in many parts of Africa or Southeast Asia, Beijing does not usually 
actively participate in international donor coordination activities in Bishkek 
or Dushanbe. Thus, Chinese economic assistance has allowed countries like 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan to avoid turning to Western lenders during the 
economic crisis, thereby diminishing Western leverage over them. It is worth 
noting that, as an external donor, China has also seen the mismanagement 
 1 I explore this topic at greater length in a forthcoming article co-authored with Daniel Nexon. See 
Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon, “The Empire will Compensate You? The Structural Dynamics 
of the U.S. Overseas Basing Network,” Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 4 (2013).
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of its funds as local elites have turned public works projects into private 
revenue streams. 
In addition, the region has spawned its own new organizations that 
provide novel frameworks for cooperation, alternative normative standards, 
and legal justifications. Groups such as the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO) and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Community Customs Union 
present themselves as more appropriate regional alternatives to the hegemonic 
Western counterparts, even as they quite deliberately copy the organizational 
forms, if not substance, of the Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), NATO, and the European Union. These new regional organizations 
provide legal and normative buffers to member states from external pressures 
and international criticism. 
There is also, I would argue, a sociological dimension at play here: a rising 
global demand in policy and academic circles for a workable antithesis or model 
to U.S.-led international architectures. Such analysis, as Laruelle observes, 
permeates and biases much coverage of the SCO and, I would add, its more 
global counterpart, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) 
forum. Why else would there be such international fascination with the SCO 
despite the gaping mismatch between its ambitious multilateral agenda and 
its actual meager accomplishments? Similarly, what makes the meme that the 
U.S. promotes double-standards on human rights when dealing with Central 
Asian rulers so resonant, when realpolitik long dominated its Cold War policy 
to friendly autocrats? 
It is here that the contemporary global spotlight becomes more damaging. 
For regardless of Washington’s actual intentions and limited regional ambitions, 
the United States’ struggles in Central Asia have been publicly aired by global 
media outlets and international advocacy groups, many of them keen to 
note the inconsistency between Washington’s value-based rhetoric and its 
strategic bargains.
U.S. Engagement in Central Asia after the Drawdown  
of U.S. Forces from Afghanistan
Finally, the roundtable raises the critical question of just what type of 
engagement the United States should maintain in Central Asia given its 
drawdown from Afghanistan. 
The answer, I think, depends on the criteria that are invoked when posing 
the question. If the question posed asks what the vital U.S. long-term strategic 
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interests are in the region, seeing none, a plausible case for disengagement 
could be made. However, abandoning the region would be shortsighted, and 
the roundtable authors offer some important and forward-looking strategic 
rationales for maintaining engagement. Looking eastward, Kuchins views U.S. 
sustained engagement in Eurasia as a logical accompaniment to Washington’s 
East Asian pivot. Wimbush sees the complexity and layering of the region, and 
of its different actors, as a compelling reason for why the United States must 
remain engaged as an arena of global interest. He also advocates that U.S. troops 
would provide a stabilizing presence in the region, perhaps by maintaining a 
residual force in Uzbekistan. 
Both are important strategic rationales to consider, but both also carry 
some risks. Chinese and U.S. relations in Central Asia have been relatively 
cooperative, but the potential for competition certainly exists in areas such 
as energy politics and some of the global order issues identified earlier. The 
combination of a more robust Silk Road strategy, an enduring U.S. security 
presence on China’s western flank, and Beijing’s fear of outside meddling 
in Xinjiang might make the U.S. presence in Eurasia the target of a future 
Chinese counterthrust. 
Wimbush’s plea for an enduring regional military presence in Uzbekistan 
may be particularly disconcerting to Russia, which seems to have used the 
uncertainty generated by the U.S. drawdown to opportunistically reassert 
itself in its relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, concluding deals for new 
military bases, promising new military assistance packages and investments in 
strategic sectors, and pressing these states to commit to joining the Moscow-
led customs union. In the Kyrgyz case, Moscow has also compelled Bishkek 
to stick to a public commitment that it will close Manas in 2014 following the 
expiration of the current agreement. 
Given Tsereteli’s observation about the growing disconnect between 
Russian ambitions and capabilities, the regional fallout of Moscow’s renewed 
effort to turn the smaller Central Asian states into political clients may become 
messy if Russian support exacerbates long-standing regional rivalries with 
Uzbekistan over water rights, disputes about borders and ethnic enclaves, and, 
as Tsereteli identifies, the uncertainty of looming political transitions in Astana 
and Tashkent. The potential for regional entanglements by the United States and 
Russia in local disputes, even in the pursuit of stability, remains ever-present.
On the other hand, a good case can be made that the drawdown from 
Afghanistan will untie the hands of both Washington and Brussels and allow 
them to focus on a more balanced portfolio of non-security matters, including 
promoting international legal standards, campaigning for the whole Central 
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Asian region’s accession into the WTO, bettering the region’s still dismal 
human rights records, encouraging educational programs and exchanges, and 
improving governance and transparency. Even in the realm of continued security 
cooperation and counterterrorism, there is room both to remain effective 
against transnational threats and to nudge local and regional practices toward 
greater conformity with emerging international practices and legal standards. 
And at some point, U.S. and EU officials will need to make a more public case 
about why their approaches to regional challenges—such as ensuring political 
stability, mitigating and resolving conflicts, guaranteeing minority and religious 
rights, nurturing civil society, and insisting on transparency in government—
are not just policies that suit the agendas of the West, but actually offer a more 
sustainable basis for pursuing state-building and regional integration, and 
indeed for partaking in globalization itself. But the West will be hard-pressed 
to actually sell these messages unless policymakers can demonstrate a longer-
term regional commitment to the Central Asian governments, as well as some 
humility and self-reflection on the so-called “values issues.”
I fully agree that complexity and uncertainty are likely to characterize 
the region for some time. In response, the United States must overcome its 
strategic fatigue, be more pragmatic in its dealings with Moscow and Beijing, 
and accept that its actions in this region have important, even if unintended, 
demonstration effects in other venues on a variety of security, economic, 
social, and legal matters. All the while, Washington must do a better job of 
listening to local perspectives about the region’s looming challenges and actively 
defending U.S. principles and norms from regional alternatives that are gaining 
currency. In short, successful multipolar diplomacy will require considerable 
multitasking. 
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